

FOREIGN POLICY bulletin



AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 5

Tanks and Tractors in Syria

by Clifford Dancer

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The crisis in Syria—and the Middle East—has been reported in the American press in conventional terms of coups and counter-coups, feudal landowners, poverty and intense Arab nationalism. Actually, Syrian national life in the past decade has been undergoing a profound process of Westernization that makes this stereotype report misleading.

Until recently Syria was not an integrated nation, due in part to France's divisive administrative policies when Syria was a French League of Nations mandate (1922-1945). Loyalties were focused on provincial centers, the village, the family and tribal units. Today a more integrated national life is developing, and there are three elements responsible for this: a group of Aleppo merchants, the Ba'ath party, and the army.

Of these three elements, future historians may well place the chief emphasis on the role played by the "merchant-tractorists" from the Aleppo area in northern Syria, who, equipped with modern agricultural machinery purchased in the West, have wrought a startling transformation in their country's agricultural production. They have brought large-scale mechanized farming to tens of thousands of

acres in the rain-fed belt of land paralleling the Turkish border and running east to Iraq. In the postwar period the acreage under production has doubled, grain output has increased by 64 percent, and cotton output has gone up eightfold. Save for parts of Africa and North America, no other area of the world has enjoyed a greater per capita increase in agricultural production in the same period.

One consequence of this activity is that these free enterprise Aleppo merchants and traders, whose political outlook resembles that of 19th-century British Liberals, now look to the government for public works projects such as better roads, schools, agricultural research centers, irrigation works and so on, which will further integrate national life.

Meanwhile, in the southern part of the country, where it has its widest following, the Ba'ath party has wrought an equally significant change in Syria's political life. Aside from the Communists and the outlawed fascist Syrian Social Nationalists, the Ba'ath is the only group which resembles political parties as they are understood in the West. It has a program (Arab unity, neutralism, and land reform), an ideology (non-Marxist so-

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cialism), and excellent organization. The party's leaders are Akram Hourani, the newly elected speaker of the Chamber of Deputies who may become prime minister or president; Michel Aflaq, secretary-general of the party; and Salah Bitar (foreign minister of Syria). All party decisions are said to be taken collectively by this triumvirate aided by younger advisers.

What Is the Ba'ath?

The Ba'ath—which means “resurrection” (of Arab greatness)—was formed in February 1953 as the result of the amalgamation of Hourani's Arab Socialist party, which drew its main support from the peasants and workers, and the Arab Renaissance party of Bitar and Aflaq, with its following of students, intellectuals, and some middle-class professional people. Today the Ba'ath has branches in Jordan and Iraq, where it operates underground, and in Egypt, where Nasser recently agreed to the establishment of a branch among students and intellectuals. Another group may soon be established in Lebanon.

At present the Ba'ath holds 17 seats out of 142 in the Chamber of Deputies, but if an election were held tomorrow, it would probably emerge as Syria's strongest party. It subordinates all other aims to the quest for unity of the Arab world—from Iraq in the east to Morocco in the west, and Syria in the north to the Sudan in the south. By its tense concentration on the drive for unity and by bringing a new organization

to the political life of Syria, the Ba'ath has made its contribution to integration of the country's national life.

Role of Army

The Ba'ath and the Syrian Druze community were instrumental in overthrowing Colonel Adib Shishakli, the third and last of independent Syria's military dictators, on February 25, 1954. Since then the army has taken orders from the civilian leadership, although if a serious breach in opinion were to develop, it would probably establish another military dictatorship. For the past ten years the army, as in Israel, has been one of the main forces in developing an integrated nation through the training which it has given to thousands of men and women who, perhaps for the first time, began to identify themselves with their national life.

Some of the army's leading officers are either Ba'ath sympathizers or hold membership in the party. Others, like General Afif Bizri, now chief of staff, are to the left of the Ba'ath.

To aid in the further development of their free enterprise economy, the Syrians turned to the World Bank for a loan in 1956. According to a high Syrian official, the bank offered \$33.5 million over 20 years at 4.75 percent interest, with the understanding that projects to be financed by the loan would be supervised by American technicians. Because of the “high” interest rate and the latter condition, according to this same official, Syria rejected the loan and

turned to the Soviet Union for help. The Russians on October 29 signed an economic and technical assistance agreement with Syria, but the figure of Soviet credits was not mentioned.

For American policy in the Middle East, as well as in the rest of the underdeveloped world, the emergence of the Soviet Union as an alternative source of economic, technical and military aid poses grave problems. For the first time in their history, the countries of the Middle East can look to other than Western nations for large-scale economic aid, and on terms which they prefer—long-term, low-interest-rate loans.

All of these recent changes in Syrian national life remain to be consolidated. The position of the Ba'ath as the country's dominant political party is still not secure, and neither is the left wing's hold over the military leadership. The October arrival of Egyptian troops in Syria was due to the need of both these groups for security against a domestic coup rather than in terms of security against the Turkish “threat” from the north. The accelerated tempo of Syria's economic development has increased expectations in all walks of life. The stage has been set for progress unless impatience among left-wing military leaders for more spectacular results takes the country further in the direction of the Soviet Union.

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347

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After Earth Satellites — What?

The Soviet ICBM and two satellites have touched off plenty of reaction—but as yet little concrete action—here in Washington. The official attitude is still that there is very little to worry about, that the earth satellite has not affected security “one iota,” that Moscow’s ICBM undoubtedly missed its target.

But the ground swell of criticism of the Administration for letting the U.S.S.R. get this scientific and weapons jump on the United States is rising rapidly. It has not yet reversed the reductions in research and missile development, which explain a large part of the Soviet success—although it seems to have halted them. It has brought a lot of talk of “speed up,” of a “crash program”—but so far only talk. Pressure, however, is unquestionably mounting. The Administration is not going to be able to keep the lid on much longer.

Secretary of State Dulles’ charge that it is the country, not the Administration, which has been “complacent” in this period of Soviet scientific advances is not regarded here as valid. For mounting evidence indicates that the Administration knew well what the Russians were doing, but made no effort to meet them or beat them—or to inform the public about the situation.

At no time did the White House go to the public or Congress and say, “We’ve got to have a lot of money if we are going to beat the Russians on missiles and earth satellites; do you want to win this race or not? Instead the Administration pared expenditures all the way down the line; it belittled basic research; it reduced satellite projects; it forbade overtime. It repeated over and over that the

nation’s security was not in danger, that it could get along with the weapons it had, that it was determined to balance the budget. True, Congress cut the Administration’s request for defense funds, but the President went along with it and agreed he could “live” with it.

Washington Misjudged Reaction

The Administration appears to have misjudged public and foreign reaction to the Soviet Sputnik and ICBM. It is only reporting facts to state that for the first time since Mr. Eisenhower entered the White House there is now vocal personal criticism of him on military matters and decisions. Some say that the President has been badly advised or overly protected by his advisers, that he has not kept up on developments or their implications. Others, more harsh, charge the President with bad judgment and with mismanagement of the satellite program. For the first time since 1953 criticism is directed not only at Charles E. Wilson and John Foster Dulles but at the President himself. Nor are these criticisms confined to Democrats. They are made by Republicans as well, notably Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey. Senators by the score, including Republican Senators, are comparing Soviet scientific advances with American progress—and to America’s distinct disadvantage.

It is possible that the President, by revealing what the United States is actually doing, will calm the national sense of frustration, of humiliation. Perhaps he could revive the faith of our allies in our scientific ingenuity and skill by disclosing

United States plans and accomplishments, as now proposed after his talk with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. But the President will have to take personal control of the situation, as he apparently plans to do, according to his announcement of October 21 that he will make a series of speeches to the nation. Leadership is the responsibility of the President, and—what practically every correspondent in Washington knows—the President will have to lead the country out of this apparent defeat in weapons development or see Congress and the public usurp that leadership.

Fortunately two factors will help the President: our allies and the Kremlin. Our allies, particularly the British, are quite aware that Soviet scientific progress is going to be matched or surpassed only if the West pools its talents and research. So the British and our other Western allies are pleading for scientific cooperation, and there are signs the President and Congress are ready to accept this. Also the Russians, not so much by Sputnik itself as by blatant Sputnik diplomacy, are driving the West into tighter bonds of security. Just as Stalin repeatedly tightened the Western alliance by his provocations, so Khrushchev by his Middle East blasts and missile threats is forcing the West to strengthen its ties.

So, dark as the picture is, it is not all black. The President has yet time to reverse the West’s military decline and the deterioration of the grand alliance. But to do this he will have to assume leadership both of the United States and of the non-Communist alliance.

NEAL STANFORD



Perspective on Russia

The furore created by Russia's launching of an earth satellite on October 4, the threatening tone of Soviet pronouncements about the Middle East, and the announcement on October 26 that Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov had been removed from his post as defense minister have suddenly focused the West's attention on the need to reevaluate its attitude toward the U.S.S.R.

This reevaluation had long been overdue. Although Western correspondents had been reporting changes both in Moscow's domestic policies and in its relations with Eastern Europe, and Western officials had invoked these changes as the reason for arms reductions, no major attempt has been made since the 1954 Geneva "summit" conference to draw the consequences of post-Stalin developments. It was apparently assumed in London and Washington, in Bonn and Paris, that time was on the side of the West, which could afford to wait until the Russians had altered their course in a way acceptable to the West and had accepted its terms on specific controversial issues such as disarmament and German unification.

The New Dimension

Although at times Secretary of State Dulles seemed to presage greater flexibility, in essence the West, explicitly or implicitly, seemed to be waiting for the deterioration of communism not only in Russia but also in Eastern Europe and China. This expectation gave the West's post-Stalin policy a static appearance—of response to Moscow's challenges rather than of new initiatives.

This static condition came abrupt-

ly to an end with the appearance of Sputnik. The earth's satellite in outer space, by an extraordinary coincidence of events, gave a new dimension to Russia and its satellites on earth. It is essential for the future security of the West, and of the world as a whole, that this new dimension should be measured with as much accuracy as scientists around the globe have devoted to the "beep" of the earth satellite.

What is new about Russia today is not its scientific ability, which was known to Western scientists even before the advent of communism. The new dimension is that the Russians are now in a position to implement the creative gifts of their scientists with the technological skills acquired in the 40 years of industrialization. These have been grim years for the Russian people—years of sacrificing the amenities and even necessities of existence to the creation of a base for modern industry, which was enforced by a totalitarian government determined to have Russia "catch up with and outstrip the capitalist countries."

No fair-minded democrat can deny or overlook the hardships and cruelties this vast and sustained effort has imposed on the Russians. Even the Communist leaders, in their private thoughts, must have occasionally wondered whether the price they were asking the country to pay was not excessive—and we know that this question has been openly discussed by non-Russian Communists in Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. But there is another question which may not be answered for years—perhaps not in our lifetime. It is, Can any underdeveloped country effect

the transition from the 15th or 16th or 18th or 19th century, in which it is living today, to 1957 without undergoing hardships and making sacrifices if it is to fulfill even the most modest aspirations of its people? It is not an accident that the leader of the greatest democracy in Asia, Prime Minister Nehru, has warned his countrymen: "Our generation is condemned to hard labor."

A Victory for Underdeveloped

The Russian leaders may have no other interest in Sputnik than as a demonstration of their capacity to produce guided missiles, and thus to achieve their world objectives by threats of force without the need to undergo a wasteful war. But in the perspective of history the launching of the earth satellite may have a different and far greater significance. It has dramatically shown that a people who 40 years ago were predominantly backward peasants, 70 percent illiterate, have not only mastered the three R's but have developed the basic research essential for modern technology and have become proficient in applied science. Russia's use of German scientists and such advantages as it may have gained through spies do not detract from this achievement—for the Western nations, too, used one or both of these sources of information. As already pointed out, Russia's industrial development was won at a terrible price for its people. But it is important for us to recognize this development and not delude ourselves about it.

One thing has not been fully appreciated, although it is working in

(Continued on page 39)



What Are Lessons of Sputnik for U.S.?

Lessons for Political Leaders

From the transcript of President Eisenhower's news conference of October 9 in The New York Times of October 10:

ROBERT E. CLARK of International News Service, — Mr. President, do you think our scientists made a mistake in not recognizing that we were, in effect, . . . in a race with Russia in launching this satellite, and not asking you for top priority and more money to speed up the program?

A.—Well, no, I don't, because as—even yet, let's remember this: The value of that satellite around the earth, going around the earth, is still problematical. . . . Now, the—so far as the missile—this satellite is concerned, if we were doing it for science, and the only—and not for security, which we were doing, I don't know of any reasons why the scientists should have come in and urged that we do this before anybody else could.

Now, quite naturally, you will say, "Well, the Soviets gained a great psychological advantage throughout the world," and I think in the political sense that is possibly true; but in the scientific sense it is not true, except for the proof of the one thing, that they have got the propellants and the projectors that will put these things in the air. . . .

HAZEL MARKEL of National Broadcasting Company — Mr. President, in light of the great faith which the American people have in your military knowledge and leadership, are

you saying at this time that with the Russian satellite whirling about the world, you are not more concerned nor overly concerned about our nation's security?

A.—Well, I think I have time and again emphasized my concern about the nation's security. I believe I just a few months back went on the television to make a special plea about this. As a matter of fact, I pled very strongly for \$38 billion in new appropriations this year, and was cut quite severely in that new appropriation for next year.

Now, as far as the satellite itself is concerned, that does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota. I see nothing at this moment, at this stage of development, that is significant in that development as far as security is concerned, except, as I pointed out, it does definitely prove the possession by the Russian scientists of a very powerful thrust in their rocketry, and that is important, and I can only say that I have had every group that I know anything about, to ask them, Is there anything more we can do in the development of our rocket program any better than is being done? And, except for certain minor items or, you might say, almost involving administration, there has been little said.

Excerpts from address by Vice President Richard M. Nixon at the International Industrial Development Conference in San Francisco on October 15, 1957:

Militarily the Soviet Union is not one bit stronger today than it was before the satellite was launched. . . .

But we could make no greater mistake than to brush off this event as a scientific event of more significance to the man in the moon than to men on earth. . . . We have had a grim and timely reminder of a truth we must never overlook—that the Soviet Union has developed a scientific and industrial capacity of great magnitude. . . . It does mean that we must be prepared for an all-out Communist economic offensive to win the allegiance of hundreds of millions of people in the uncommitted world, as well as even some of those in the free world.

From a statement by Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, on October 15, 1957:

"Now is the time to assess just where we are in relative strength as against the Communists; and to gauge what must be done if our nation and the free world are to survive the threat which the Communists now pose against us.

As we do this, it is important to recognize the capability of the possible enemy.

In the past ten years, seven times the Soviets have shocked the free world with their engineering and scientific developments. These accomplishments were the A-bomb in 1949; the MIG-15 in 1950; the H-bomb in 1953; the long-range jet bomber, in quantity, in 1955; their tremendous new submarine fleet by 1956; and now the ICBM announcement in 1957—followed closely by its visible offshoot, the successfully launched Sputnik.

During these same ten years, what

have we achieved in military technological accomplishment in the interest of our own security? We already had the A-bomb, four years before the Soviet. We met the MIG-15 in Korea with jet fighters, first equal, then superior, in quality, but outnumbered by thousands in quantity.

The United States tested its first H-bomb a few months before the Soviets made the same test. (Our lead on the A-bomb was four years; our lead on the H-bomb a few months. In 1953, therefore, it was already evident that the gap was closing.) In 1955 we had long-range jet bombers, as did the Soviet.

What U.S. Lacks

But it may surprise you to know that even today, in late 1957, more of our Strategic Air Command wings still fly old piston-engine B-36's than fly jet-powered B-52's. And it may further surprise you to learn that a Defense Department directive issued late last month will have the effect of slowing down the development of the first supersonic bomber, the B-58, slated to follow the B-52's and B-47's.

In the missile field, all the world now knows that the Soviets have their Sputnik flying around the earth every hour and a half. We plan to have our Vanguard satellite, nine times smaller, in the air by next spring. As to the intercontinental ballistic missile, the world also well knows—as Mr. Khrushchev observed last week—that the United States does not yet have such a weapon.

What Should Be Done

Despite Soviet claims that they do have it, and have it ready for operational use, we can assume they are from two to three years away from being armed with one that is militarily effective. We can be sure, how-

ever, that in the interim they will make maximum political use of what they already have.

And now this is what I believe should be done, and as soon as possible. The President should immediately call a special session of Congress. The President should explain to Congress and the people the national emergency in which our lagging defense program—particularly in the ballistic missile, the antisubmarine and the antiballistic missile programs—has placed us. Congress should thereupon pass whatever legislation is necessary to organize our technical and other talents full-time on the job of overtaking the Soviets where they lead, and maintaining our superiority where we lead.

Specifically, no Manhattan Project should be created, because that action, piling a sixth department on the, in effect, five we already have, could only add to the rivalry, confusion and waste now characteristic of the operation of the Department of Defense. What we now need, and quickly, is more unification of the Services, not less.

Meanwhile, as an immediate practical measure in support of the foregoing, we should step up the tempo of current defense programs from a five-day-week operation to seven days a week, and withdraw such fiscal ceilings as overtime restrictions. These restrictions are currently heavily retarding the defense program. . . .

There should be a thorough and realistic analysis made, and from a military requirements point of view, of the scores of costly weapons systems which have been developed independently by the various Services since World War II. Those weapons systems thereupon determined not appropriate to the actual threat should be promptly abandoned, be-

cause in this action lies our greatest potential economy.

Let us hope the President will take whatever steps are necessary to get all the facts—and then give those facts to the people. For public opinion, the final arbiter in a democracy, cannot rightly function unless the people are fully informed. In this crisis, therefore, each and every one of us should watch with close attention any future statements about the plans and programs incident to the defense of our country.

Lessons for Scientists

Excerpts from the Statement on the Urgency of International Control of Space Weapons by the Executive Committee of the Federation of American Scientists, October 9, 1957:

Scientists of all countries salute the scientific and technical achievement of the U.S.S.R. in successfully launching a satellite into space. The world's imagination is stirred by the promise implicit in this historic event of new knowledge and exciting new frontiers. . . .

Need for Control

Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have expressed willingness to negotiate international control of "space weapons." United States Ambassador Lodge, in his statement before the UN Political Committee last January, expressed the hope that "future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes," and indicated willingness "to participate in fair, balanced, reliable systems of control." Now, Communist party leader Khrushchev, on the eve of renewed full-scale disarmament discussions before that same UN committee, has declared that the Soviet Union is also willing to submit to international control of its developments in this area.

In the past, attempts to reach

agreement have failed either because control plans have been offered only in the context of broader disarmament agreements, or because adequate inspection systems were not provided for.

The Federation of American Scientists renews its appeal of last year that all possibilities for even limited "first-step" agreements for the control of nuclear weapons and of intercontinental ballistic missiles be most carefully explored. In particular, it would appear feasible at once to ban further tests of large nuclear weapons and of long-range rocket weapons, empowering an appropriately constituted UN agency to monitor such an agreement. Because of recent advances in long-range detection systems, the number of inspection sites necessary for such monitoring need not be great. This same UN agency could be authorized to undertake, on an international basis, research on and development of long-range rockets and earth satellites for peaceful purposes. Limited agreements along these lines might prove invaluable by providing a break-through in the prolonged disarmament negotiations which have to date been so disappointing. Concessions will be necessary on both sides, but they must be made. The time is short.

Lessons for Educators

Professor George J. Yevick of Stevens Institute of Technology in a letter to the editor of The New York Times of October 11, 1957:

A reading of the newspapers seems to indicate that we have not learned the lessons to be drawn from Soviet advances in satellites, high energy physics, thermonuclear power, etc.

Once more a heavy clamor rises for more military expenditure as an answer to the satellite.

We should like to point out that

the satellite is first and foremost a scientific achievement for all mankind to rejoice over. This is a great positive accomplishment. The military aspect is negative and, we maintain, a minor one. Contrary to Mr. Khrushchev's statement in his recent interview with James Reston, both sides are, and have been during the past five years, in a position to annihilate each other.

What is sorely lacking is research—fundamental research on a vast scale, for it is precisely this which is the "goose that lays the golden egg." It is quite misleading to say that the annual budget for scientific research is \$6 billion. The overwhelming portion of this goes into military applied work or manufacturing development. The actual amount going into pure research is exceedingly small.

What can be done quickly and thoroughly?

An enormous increase in the backing of basic scientific research.

A Secretary of Science of very high Cabinet rank. He should be a first-class scientist and administrator.

Special public schools, entrance only by competitive examination, after the junior high school, where the tempo and quality of scientific education are comparable or superior to the German gymnasium.

Federal scientific scholarships numbering around 100,000 a year. There should be a sliding scale according to ability to pay.

Last, but not least, there exists an overwhelming necessity for several dozen advanced institutes of science. Here, again, money should not be the primary limitation. The budget of each institute should be around \$50 million per annum.

Failure to carry out a bold program, which is within our means to achieve, spells abnegation of a great responsibility both to ourselves and to all living mankind.

Spotlight

(Continued from page 36)

our favor. It is that this creativity is not confined solely to scientists who, admittedly, enjoy special privileges and receive particular encouragement in the U.S.S.R. Reports from Eastern Europe by a wide variety of observers suggest that the peoples of the satellite countries are in a state of profound intellectual ferment, which is being reflected in many fields of endeavor, including those we call "cultural." As Harrison E. Salisbury has pointed out in his series of stimulating reports from Eastern Europe (*The New York Times*, October 21-25), the significant thing is that this ferment has developed among Communists. And it is important to note that the first evidence of this new trend emerged into public view, not in Poland or Hungary, but in Russia itself, where the demand for greater freedom in literature, art and music antedated the death of Stalin.

Intellectual Ferment

This does not mean that we are about to see the establishment in Russia and Eastern Europe of political institutions modeled on those of Britain and the United States. To expect this is to misunderstand the history of the West. In the countries bordering on the Atlantic, democracy as we know it today did not precede the Industrial Revolution. It was a product of the far-reaching economic and social changes which this revolution brought about. And it may be useful to recall that the French Revolution, which signaled the rise to power of the middle class, alarmed many contemporary critics, notably Edmund Burke.

If, as now seems possible, industrialization in Russia, which produced Sputnik, brings about gradual

liberalization, there may be a withering away, not of the state, as predicted by Marxists, but of the form of communism, which represented Russia's modern revolution, developed in its first 40 years. But it does not necessarily mean, as Mr. Salisbury points out even for the more Westernized Eastern European countries, the disappearance of communism, for the changes now under way are being made by Communists, who are responding to changing public opinion. Whether they can succeed in reforming communism is another question.

Foreign Policy and Geography

Nor should we assume that a non-Communist government in Russia, even though more agreeable in its manners, would be less concerned with the country's interests in Europe and Asia, in the Middle East and Africa. Peter the Great battled Sweden and Turkey in an effort to win for Russia ice-free outlets to the open seas. Alexander I, hailed as an idealist and a peacemaker, defied his military chief, Marshal Kutuzov, and pursued the shattered remnants of Napoleon's armies across Europe, entering Paris as a victor. The 19th-century Tsars occupied and subjugated Central Asia and the Russian Far East, which are now part of what in our time we call the Communist; but should more prop-

erly call the Russian, empire.

No nation can wholly divest itself of its geography. We can see this when Gomulka, after proclaiming his country's independence from Russia, points out that Poland cannot disregard its geographic position; or when Tito recognizes the East German government because of Yugoslavia's persistent fear of a reunited and remilitarized Germany.

Drawing the Consequences

If this analysis should prove to be correct, what can the West do in dealing with the new-dimensional Russia?

The alternative of merely waiting for the downfall of communism has been foreclosed by the sudden realization that Russia, however backward it may be politically compared to the Western nations, has become technologically a 20th-century power. There remain two alternatives. The West can decide to pass from the military defensive to the military offensive, and try to defeat Russia before it acquires greater power. The most likely place for such a test of strength would be the Middle East, where the principal protagonists are not Turkey and Syria but the United States and the U.S.S.R. The stakes there are high—but so are the risks that a seemingly local engagement might spell a nuclear holocaust.

The other alternative, which has

not been given a decisive trial since World War II, would be to recognize as facts of life both the existence of communism and the emergence of Russia as a modern nation, and to draw practical conclusions from these facts. In Europe this could spell either continuance of a divided Germany or a unified German nation shorn of its NATO ties. And a European settlement may be considerably eased if the Eastern European countries should adopt a neutralist position between the West and the U.S.S.R. In the Middle East it could mean either the withdrawal of all the great powers, or acceptance of the fact that Russia is one of the great powers which has just as much of an interest in that area as the United States, Britain and France. A settlement there would be eased by the ending of all arms shipments to the Arabs as well as to Israel. In Asia it could mean that the United States would have to reconcile itself, if not with Peiping, at least with the continued existence of a Communist government on the mainland.

These are difficult decisions, and the American public has not been adequately prepared for them. But Sputnik has spotlighted, as never before, the world's Pandora box of troubles, and henceforth it will be difficult to slam the lid down on discussions of these alternatives.

—VERA-MICHELES DEAN

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In this issue:

Tanks and Tractors in Syria— C. Dancer	33
After Earth Satellites—What?— N. Stanford	35
Perspective on Russia—V. M. Dean	36
What Are Lessons of Sputnik for U.S.?	37

In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report— Will Thailand Shift Its Course? by John Brown Mason
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